

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

THE MOUNTAINEERS, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C05-1418RSM

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND FOR PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AND DENYING
CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Entry of Permanent Injunction and defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. #13 and #17). Plaintiffs argue that the Mad River Trail Project violates a 1999 ruling by the Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge, in a separate case in this Court, and that irrespective of the effect of Judge Rothstein’s order, the decision by the Forest Service to proceed with the Mad River Trail Project was arbitrary and capricious, and does not pass the standard of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000) (“APA”). Plaintiffs further argue that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000) (“NEPA”) and its implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2005), in its preparation of the Mad River Trail Project Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and related analyses. Finally, plaintiffs request that the

1 Court enter a permanent injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from attempting or
2 completing any work on the Mad River Trail Project, or otherwise taking action to implement
3 that project, until the agency has complied with NEPA by completing a full Environmental
4 Impact Study (“EIS”).

5 Defendants argue that the Forest Service’s decision to proceed with the Mad River Trail
6 Project violates “neither the letter nor the spirit” of Judge Rothstein’s 1999 order. Defendants
7 next argue that the EA meets the reasonable range of alternatives requirements that NEPA
8 imposes. Finally, the government argues that the Forest Service did not violate Judge
9 Rothstein’s order by failing to undertake a study of the site-specific impacts of the trail system
10 on wildlife because it, in fact, conducted such a study.

11 For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with defendants and GRANTS
12 plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and for preliminary injunction.

13 **II. DISCUSSION**

14 **A. Background**

15 This case involves a challenge to the United States Forest Service’s Mad River Trail
16 Project – a plan to construct a bridge, improve a campground, build a “helispot” for helicopter
17 landings, and relocate sections of trail in the Entiat Ranger District of the Wenatchee National
18 Forest. This controversial project would allow off-road vehicles (“ORVs”) – specifically,
19 motorcycles – to access an area of the Lower Mad River Trail from Maverick Saddle in the first
20 week of June, rather than in the third or fourth week. It would also result in the continued
21 increase of motorized traffic throughout the numerous ORV trail systems connected in one way
22 or another to the Mad River system.

23 At present, ORVs cannot cross the Mad River at the Maverick Saddle ford in early June
24 due to high water. As a result, the area is only easily accessible from Maverick Saddle during
25 that period to hikers who climb across logs or backpack up from lower elevations. The
26 proposed Maverick Saddle Bridge would change this, and allow ORVs to cross the Mad River

1 onto the Lower Mad River Trail as soon as the snow melts, if not before.

2 Perhaps more significantly, by making Maverick Saddle the hub of a network of
3 interconnected trails, the project will cause an overall increase in ORV traffic not only in the
4 project area, but throughout the Wenatchee National Forest. Indeed, the Mad River project is
5 only one of numerous related projects that are either proposed, under way, or have recently
6 been completed that the Forest Service itself recognizes will have the ultimate effect, whether
7 intended or not, of increasing the use of ORVs in the Forest. *See* Administrative Record
8 (“AR”) at 2993-94.

9 The network of ORV trails in the Wenatchee National Forest is extensive and heavily
10 used. There are over 200 miles of motorized-use trails in the system, spanning around 600
11 square miles of terrain – essentially the entire area between Lake Wenatchee and Lake Chelan.
12 (*See* Dkt. #14 at 13 and Dkt. #21 at 17). Although use levels and types vary by trail, motorized
13 use dominates, and is fairly heavy; for example, in the Upper and Lower Mad River areas there
14 are some 4000 visitors per season, some 60% of whom are riding motorcycles. (*See* AR at
15 2991 and 2969).

16 The Mad River Trail Project is the latest in a long line of small projects that have together
17 created the Wenatchee National Forest’s ORV trail system. The Mad River project is physically
18 connected to another project currently in the EA phase, the Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail
19 project. The Goose-Maverick project proposes to create an ORV bypass trail connecting the
20 Mad River trail system to the nearby Goose Creek trail system. Goose-Maverick is merely the
21 most recent incarnation of a project that was derailed by previous NEPA litigation, with one
22 significant difference: parts of it have now been shifted into the Mad River Project.

23 In 1997, the Forest Service distributed an EA for the first incarnation of the Goose-
24 Maverick ORV Tie Trail project. (AR at 1900-2016). The project contained substantially the
25 same trail design as that envisioned by the current Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail EA, except
26 that it also included the Maverick Saddle Bridge. (*See* AR at 3320-87).

1 On the basis of the 1997 EA for the Goose-Maverick project, the Forest Service entered a
2 Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) and notice of decision to
3 proceed with the tie-trail project, including the Maverick Saddle Bridge. (AR at 2041-56).
4 Soon after the entry of the 1997 EA, and following a failed administrative appeal, the plaintiffs
5 in the case now before the Court – accompanied by a number of other environmental groups –
6 filed suit under the APA to enjoin the completion of the Goose-Maverick project as: (1) an
7 abuse of agency discretion; (2) arbitrary and capricious; and (3) a violation of NEPA.

8 According to the plaintiffs, the agency had performed an inadequate study of the impacts
9 of the project on non-motorized users and area wildlife. Plaintiffs also argued that the Goose-
10 Maverick EA was impermissibly segmented for NEPA purposes, in that it looked only at the
11 effects of the project on a narrowly defined study area and did not account for potential
12 resource damage in the overall trail system. Finally, plaintiffs claimed that the EA was
13 insufficient because it failed to examine the past, present, and future reasonably foreseeable
14 cumulative impacts that increased ORV use would have on the project area and related trail
15 systems.

16 Plaintiffs’ arguments were apparently persuasive. On August 31, 1999, Judge Rothstein
17 granted their motion for a preliminary injunction barring the Forest Service from proceeding
18 with the Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail project without further study. *See North Cascades*
19 *Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service*, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (1999).
20 Specifically, Judge Rothstein ruled that plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable
21 injury combined with a probability of success on the merits with respect to the question of
22 whether the Forest Service’s reliance on the February 1997 EA violated NEPA. According to
23 the Court, “the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to address the
24 cumulative environmental impacts on the ORV trail system of this Project and two other
25 proposals tied to the ORV trail system, and (2) failing to consider the Project’s effect of wildlife
26 outside of the narrowly defined ‘project area.’” *Id.* at 1196.

1 Following Judge Rothstein's ruling, the agency stipulated that it would withdraw approval
2 of the Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail project, and that there was "no longer an active dispute
3 between the parties concerning the subject matter of the lawsuit." Accordingly, the case was
4 dismissed. (Dkt. #18, Ex. A).

5 After the dismissal of *North Cascades Conservation Council*, the Forest Service returned
6 to work on the Goose-Maverick project. However, it shifted the disputed Maverick Saddle
7 bridge proposal (among the most contentious aspects of the first lawsuit) from the Goose-
8 Maverick ORV Tie Trail project to the more innocuous Mad River Trail Project, which
9 contained elements that would actually reduce the environmental impacts of ORVs. (See AR at
10 2935) (Mad River EA).

11 In 2003, the Forest Service also completed two new Biological Assessments addressing
12 the impact of the Mad River Trail project on endangered, threatened, and sensitive species. The
13 first Biological Assessment examined the impact of the proposed project on terrestrial species.
14 (AR at 2619-37). The second addressed key fish species in the Mad River watershed. (AR at
15 2638-2715). In addition, the agency commissioned and completed a "literature review," (the
16 "Gaines Report," so named after one of its authors), which sought to develop an analytic model
17 with which the effects of "linear recreation routes" (i.e., roads and trails) could be assessed with
18 respect to particular species. (AR at 2831-2917).

19 The Forest Service then embarked on the public planning process for its desired actions.
20 It revived the Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail EA, minus the Maverick Saddle Bridge, and
21 began the simultaneous, but unconnected, scoping and drafting of the Mad River Trail Project.
22 (See AR at 2371-74) (May 1, 2001 request for comments on Mad River Trail Project). The
23 stated purpose and need for the Mad River project was to: (1) reduce trail impacts to sensitive
24 fish species; (2) limit the spread of noxious weeds; (3) ensure that existing trails meet
25 management objectives; (4) reduce visitor hazards; and (5) accommodate increased use at the
26 Pine Flats Campground. (AR at 2936).

1 On February 5, 2004, the agency announced that it had completed the EA for the Mad
2 River Trail Project, which examined four alternative actions aimed at meeting these goals. (AR
3 at 3129). Aside from the “no action” alternative, all the alternatives involved some combination
4 of rerouting ORV trails out of the Mad River flood plain, building a bridge over the River at
5 Maverick Saddle (or hardening the ford), updating the Pine Flats Campground, installing a
6 helispot, removing fire-damaged trees, and hardening trails with numerous concrete
7 “gridblocks” in the areas most prone to ORV damage. (*See* AR at 2955-60).

8 Plaintiffs objected to the proposed alternatives as written, and submitted detailed
9 comments to that effect throughout the project’s public comment periods. Among other
10 reasons, the environmental groups felt as though the analysis should be conducted in
11 conjunction with that of the Goose-Maverick project, because the two were “inextricably
12 linked.” (*See, e.g.*, AR at 3157) (letter of Sierra Club).

13 Due in part to these comments, on March 5, 2004, the Forest Service extended the
14 comment period of the Mad River Trail Project to make it coterminous with that of the Goose-
15 Maverick ORV Tie Trail project. (AR at 3148-49) (letter of Ranger Whitehall). During this
16 period, the plaintiffs submitted extensive comments complaining about the sufficiency of the
17 separate EAs. (AR at 3414-54).

18 Nonetheless, on November 17, 2004, the agency entered a FONSI based on the Mad
19 River Trail Project EA. According to the Forest Service, ORV use in the area has not resulted
20 in significant impacts to the environment. On the basis of the Biological Assessments, the
21 Forest Service also concluded that the project’s combined components at worst “may affect, but
22 are not likely to adversely affect,” any threatened, endangered, or sensitive species. (AR at
23 3526-27) (FONSI).

24 Questioning the conclusions of the FONSI, plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal with
25 the agency seeking reconsideration of the project, but were denied. (Dkt. #14, Ex. 10). This
26 lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs allege that the Forest Service has failed to analyze the effects of the

1 Mad River Trail Project on the human environment adequately to satisfy NEPA, and is violating
2 Judge Rothstein's 1999 order. Plaintiffs also allege that the agency's decision to proceed with
3 the project is arbitrary, capricious, and should be permanently enjoined unless an Environmental
4 Impact Statement ("EIS") is conducted that more completely addresses the environmental
5 impacts of increased motorized use on existing trails, engages in a detailed analysis of the
6 cumulative environmental effects of ORV use in the project area, and contains a full scientific
7 study of the effects of such use on wildlife.

8 **B. Summary Judgment Standard**

9 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
10 and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
11 "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
12 preclude the entry of summary judgment." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248
13 (1986).

14 A district court reviewing an agency decision under Section 706 of the APA "is to
15 determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted
16 the agency to make the decision it did." *Occidental Eng'g Co. v. Immigration and*
17 *Naturalization Serv.*, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). *See also Citizens to Preserve Overton*
18 *Park v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), *overruled on other ground by Califano v. Sanders*,
19 430 U.S. 99 (1977); *Lands Council v. Vaught*, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 (E.D. Wash. 2002).
20 Thus, when causes of action arise from a complete administrative record, summary judgment is
21 appropriate. *See, e.g., National Audubon Soc. v. Butler*, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188 (W.D.
22 Wash. 2001); *Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen*, 589 F. Supp. 113, 118 (N.D. Cal.
23 1984).

24 This necessitates that the Court examine whether defendants' failure to prepare an EIS for
25 the Mad River Trail Project and related actions violates NEPA as a matter of law. In making
26 this determination, the Court is generally restricted to review of the administrative record as it

1 existed at the time of the agency's decision. However, a court may properly consider extra-
2 record materials "to determine what matters the agency should have considered but did not,"
3 *Asarco, Inc. v. EPA*, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980). *See also Seattle Audubon Society v.*
4 *Moseley*, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (W.D. Wash. 1992). Here, the Court has already ruled that
5 the some extra-record materials are admissible for the purposes of its decision. (*See* Dkt. #25).

6 **C. Effect of Judge Rothstein's Prior Order**

7 As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the Forest Service's actions
8 "violate" Judge Rothstein's 1999 Order. That Order granted a preliminary injunction, pending a
9 decisions on the merits, that barred the Forest Service from proceeding with the previous
10 incarnation of the Goose-Maverick ORV Tie Trail project without studying the cumulative
11 impacts of that project on the environment. Because a key component of that project, the
12 proposed Maverick Saddle Bridge, has been incorporated into the current Mad River Trail
13 Project, a decision to forge ahead could have been contrary to law were Judge Rothstein's
14 Order still binding.

15 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the 1999 Order no longer carries any force of law. Following
16 the entry of the Order, the parties in that case stipulated that there was "no longer an active
17 dispute between the parties concerning the subject matter of the lawsuit"; as a result, the case
18 was dismissed and no ruling was made on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. (*See* Dkt. # 18-2)
19 (Government's Exhibit A). Defendants correctly note that upon dismissal of *North Cascades*
20 *Conservation Council*, the preliminary injunction ceased to have legal effect. Thus, the Court
21 rejects plaintiffs' argument that the Forest Service has presently "violated" the 1999 order.

22 However, Judge Rothstein's order is not without persuasive value in this particular case.
23 Defendants conceded as much during oral argument. Her examination of the earlier Goose-
24 Maverick ORV Tie Trail project EA dealt with essentially the same parties as the present action,
25 before the same Court, litigating the same legal question with respect to the same critical
26 component of a Forest Service project. To that extent, this Court finds much of the reasoning

1 persuasive to the instant case.

2 Now, as when Judge Rothstein examined the matter, “[n]othing in the administrative
3 record suggests that any environmental impact statement has ever been filed with respect to the
4 ORV system as a whole, or with respect to significant aspects of it.” *North Cascades*
5 *Conservation Council*, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. But certain key components of the
6 administrative record have changed since she examined the matter. In particular, the
7 government now offers a Biological Assessment on the impacts of the proposed project on
8 sensitive wildlife species (AR at 2619-37), a Biological Assessment on the impacts of the
9 project on sensitive fish species (AR at 2638-2715), and the Gaines Report, a literature review
10 and proposed study methodology on the impacts of motorized trail systems on wildlife (AR at
11 2831-2917), as evidence that it has complied with the procedural requirements of NEPA that
12 Judge Rothstein found lacking.

13 Accordingly, this Court’s task is to determine whether or not this new information, upon
14 which the Forest Service has based its current Mad River EA, constitutes the necessary “hard
15 look” by the agency at the “cumulative environmental impacts” of the project that Judge
16 Rothstein found to be missing from the 1997 Goose-Maverick EA. *See North Cascades*
17 *Conservation Council*, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.

18 **D. Judicial Review of NEPA Claims Under the APA**

19 NEPA does not provide a private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Agency
20 decisions allegedly violating NEPA are reviewed under the APA. *Native Ecosystems Council v.*
21 *U.S. Forest Service*, 428 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing *Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain*
22 *v. Alexander (Neighbors II)*, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under the APA, the Court
23 reviews the agency’s decision to only determine whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
24 of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); *Native*
25 *Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1238.

26 It is well established in this Circuit that an agency “is required to prepare an EIS where

1 there are substantial questions about whether a project *may* cause significant degradation of the
2 human environment.” *Native Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis in original). In
3 particular, with respect to the examination of the Forest Service’s decision to forgo the
4 preparation of an EIS, the agency must have considered such necessary information prior to the
5 entry of a FONSI that it can be said to have taken a “hard look” at the environmental
6 consequences of its actions. As the Court of Appeals has explained:

7 In reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS under NEPA, we
8 employ an arbitrary and capricious standard that requires us to determine
9 whether the agency has taken a “hard look” at the consequences of its
10 actions, “based [its decision] on a consideration of the relevant factors,” and
11 provided a “convincing statement of reasons to explain why a project’s
12 impacts are insignificant.”

13 *Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt*, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations
14 omitted). *See also Native Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1239.

15 **E. Application to Plaintiffs’ NEPA Claims**

16 Plaintiffs claim that the Mad River FONSI and the accompanying decision by the Forest
17 Service to proceed with the Mad River Trail Project without preparing an EIS were arbitrary
18 and capricious, and therefore unlawful. (Dkt. #1 at 13). Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the
19 decision violates NEPA in three ways. First, the Mad River EA fails to consider a reasonable
20 range of alternatives, as NEPA requires. (Dkt. #14 at 17). Second, the 2004 EAs for the Mad
21 River Trail Project and Goose-Maverick ORV Tie-Trail project are impermissibly segmented
22 and fail to examine the cumulative environmental impacts that the projects would have on the
23 whole Chiwawa-Entiat-Mad River ORV trail system. (Dkt. # 14 at 15). Finally, the decision
24 did not properly consider the effects that ORVs have on wildlife across the greater trail system.
25 (Dkt. #14 at 19). The Court examines these arguments in turn.

26 *1. The EA’s Range of Alternatives*

 Plaintiffs contend that the Mad River EA failed to consider an adequate range of
alternatives to satisfy NEPA. According to plaintiffs, the Forest Service was required to

1 consider in detail alternatives that provided for seasonal closures of the Lower Mad River Trail
2 to achieve the stated purpose and need for the project. (Dkt. #14 at 18). Plaintiffs also claim
3 that the Forest Service, based upon the volume of negative comments that it received on the
4 issue during the scoping process, should have considered alternatives that do not utilize
5 concrete grid blocks for trail hardening. (Dkt. #14 at 18-19). Underlying plaintiffs' rationale is
6 the basic argument that the Forest Service should have considered alternatives that would
7 reduce conflict and confrontations between hikers and motorized users. (Dkt. #14 at 18).

8 Defendants respond that NEPA does not require an agency to examine every possible
9 alternative to a proposed action. Moreover, defendants argue, NEPA does not require a
10 separate analysis of alternatives which are not significantly different from those actually
11 considered. (Dkt. #18-1 at 18). Thus, the Forest Service was under no compulsion to study the
12 alternatives that the plaintiffs suggest because, among other reasons, they were inconsistent with
13 the area's management prescriptions, compliance with which was incorporated into the EA's
14 statement of purpose and need. (Dkt. #18-1 at 19).

15 The EA examined four alternatives. The first was the so-called "no action" alternative, or
16 the status quo. The second included relocation of certain trail segments on the Lower Mad
17 River Trail out of the flood plain, construction of the Maverick Saddle Bridge, and one phase of
18 improvements at Pine Flats campground. The third was substantially the same as the second,
19 but proposed a hardening of the ford at Maverick Saddle rather than the construction of a
20 bridge. The final, "preferred," alternative included all the components of alternative two, with
21 an additional phase of campground improvements at Pine Flats. All of the alternatives included
22 construction of a helispot, use of concrete grid blocks for trail hardening, and removal of fire-
23 damaged dead trees, or "snags," that threaten to fall across the trail. (AR at 2955-65). The
24 Forest Service considered – but eliminated from detailed study – alternatives encompassing
25 plaintiffs' suggestions, as well as various others. (AR 2952-54).

26 NEPA and its implementing regulations require that an EA "rigorously explore and

1 objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and, for alternatives which were eliminated from
2 detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. §
3 1502.14(a); *North Cascades Conservation Council*, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. However, NEPA
4 does not require that the EA consider alternatives other than those which address the purpose
5 and need of the project, or those which amount to nothing more than a challenge to the
6 announced management policy of the agency. *See Northwest Coal. for Alternatives to*
7 *Pesticides v. Lyng*, 844 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1988).

8 In the instant case, the Mad River EA considered an adequate range of alternatives in
9 relation to the stated purpose and need for the project. While plaintiffs correctly point out that
10 an “EA . . . must select and discuss alternatives that foster informed decision making,” their
11 challenge to the project on the basis that the alternatives examined will not reduce user conflict
12 is beside the point. (Dkt. # 14 at 17-18). According to the Forest Service, the need for the
13 project is not to facilitate increased harmony between user groups (supposing for the sake of
14 argument that trail closures would do this), but rather to reduce the impact of current uses on
15 fish, to decrease the spread of noxious weeds, to ensure that existing trails meet Wenatchee
16 Forest Plan management objectives, to reduce visitor hazards, and to accommodate increased
17 use of Pine Flats. (AR at 2936).

18 Seasonal motorcycle closures of the Lower Mad River Trail from Maverick Saddle might
19 indeed reduce trail impacts on sensitive fish and riparian resources, as well as reduce the spread
20 of noxious weeds. Defendants correctly point out that such closures would not, however, meet
21 the management objectives of the Wenatchee Forest Plan as it currently exists. (Dkt. #18-1 at
22 19). The Forest Plan contemplates that those trails currently open to motorized use will remain
23 so. (*See* AR at 2953). Plaintiffs’ comparison to the seasonal closure of the Upper Mad is
24 inapposite; reduction of user conflict is not the guiding principle behind the Forest Service’s
25 spring closure of that area. Rather, the area is closed in the spring and early summer to preserve
26 soft soils and meadows not present in the Lower Mad. (*See* AR at 2954-55).

1 The appropriate place to raise objections to the multiple use management prescription of
2 the Forest Plan applied in the Mad River EA alternatives was at the Forest Plan level rather than
3 in a tiered EA. While it may be true that the root cause of the natural resource damage in the
4 Mad River Basin is the fact that the Forest Service allows ORVs to be ridden there at all, a
5 challenge to an EA that is an attempt to debate overarching agency policy “is not the proper
6 subject of a NEPA action.” *Lyng*, 844 F.2d at 591.

7 *2. The Forest Service’s Finding of No Significant Impact*

8 Plaintiffs next assert that the Forest Service did not sufficiently consider the cumulative
9 impacts of the Mad River Trail project, and did not properly study the impacts of the project on
10 wildlife. Plaintiffs challenge the Forest Service’s finding that the impact of the combined
11 proposed ORV trail system projects is insignificant. In order to enter a Decision Notice and
12 FONSI, the agency must have reasonably concluded that the combined impact of the projects
13 will not, in fact, significantly affect the human environment within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
14 4332(C). If, on the facts contained in the record, it is clear that the agency’s determination of
15 significance was arbitrary and that its statement of reasons why no significant impact will result
16 unconvincing, then the Court must conclude that NEPA has been violated. *See Nat’l Parks &*
17 *Conservation Ass’n*, 241 F.3d at 730. That conclusion is compelled in this case.

18 In examining the persuasiveness of the Forest Service’s finding that the Mad River Project
19 will not significantly affect the environment, the Court must look to the NEPA regulations that
20 define “significantly.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. Whether a project is significant depends on “both
21 the project’s context and its intensity.” *Id.*; *Native Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1239. According
22 to the governing regulations, the examination of a project’s context “means that the significance
23 of an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as whole (human, national), the
24 affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). Intensity, on
25 the other hand, “refers to the severity of the impact,” and requires consideration of a number of
26 factors. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b). The parties raise issues with two of these considerations, in

1 particular: (1) “[w]hether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but
2 cumulatively significant impacts,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7); and (2) “[t]he degree to which the
3 action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been
4 determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.” 40 C.F.R. §
5 1508.27(b)(9).

6 The Court acknowledges that the agency’s determination of significance “requires a high
7 level of technical expertise,” and that “the informed discretion of the responsible federal
8 agencies” are entitled to substantial deference. *Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council*,
9 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (quoting *Kleppe v. Sierra Club*, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)). However, even
10 giving such deference to the Forest Services’s scientific expertise, the Court concludes that the
11 agency’s finding that the Mad River Trail Project would have no significant environmental
12 impact was arbitrary, capricious, and a violation of NEPA.

13 While it appears that defendants have made a significant effort to remedy the failures set
14 forth in Judge Rothstein’s previous Order, they have failed to heed the warning that the “proper
15 reference point for a cumulative impacts inquiry is the entire ORV trail system.” *North*
16 *Cascades Conservation Council*, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. Instead, the agency has examined the
17 environmental effect of numerous system-impacting projects in a series of disconnected EAs
18 that make only passing reference to one another. At the same time, the Mad River EA itself
19 states that such wildlife studies as have been done “do not reflect changes in use levels,” but
20 rather merely propose models with which increased use could theoretically be studied in the
21 future. (See AR at 3103).

22 Thus, as in *North Cascades Conservation Council*, the Court concludes in this case that
23 “the EA engaged in improper speculation as to the indirect and cumulative effects that the
24 Project might have on wildlife in the area of the ORV trail system.” 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
25 For these reasons, as discussed in more detail below, the Court finds that the Forest Service has
26 failed to provide a “convincing statement of reasons to explain why [the] project’s impacts are

1 insignificant,” and that its Mad River decision was a violation of the law.

2 a. Cumulative Impacts

3 Plaintiffs argue that the Mad River and Goose-Maverick projects should have been
4 analyzed by the Forest Service together in a single EIS. According to plaintiffs, the Forest
5 Service has “persisted in treating the Mad River and Goose-Maverick components as if they
6 were totally separate and unrelated,” and that even the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
7 considers them to be simply two parts of a single proposed project. (Dkt. #14 at 15).

8 Plaintiffs point to *Lands Council v. Powell*, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), for the
9 proposition that the general rule of cumulative impacts analysis under NEPA requires a
10 sufficiently detailed catalogue of past, present, and future projects, and must provide adequate
11 discussion about how those projects, and differences between those projects, are thought to
12 have impacted the environment. (Dkt. #14 at 17). That requirement mirrors the definition of
13 cumulative impacts under NEPA:

14 *Cumulative impact* is the impact on the environment which results from the
15 incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
16 reasonably foreseeable actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-
17 Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can
18 result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place
19 over a period of time.

20 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs contend that the Mad River and Goose-
21 Maverick EAs, and the Mad River FONSI, fail to “catalogue, analyze or even mention
22 numerous past ORV construction components in the 200-mile Entiat Mad-River trail system,”
23 and, more significantly, the cumulative impacts of these actions have *never* been studied by the
24 Forest Service. (Dkt. # 14 at 17).

25 Defendants argue that plaintiffs misunderstand the requirements of NEPA, and that the
26 Mad River EA, standing alone, sufficiently analyzes the cumulative environmental impacts of
the trail project. In support of this argument, they cite to *Kleppe v. Sierra Club* for the
proposition that the “Supreme Court long ago rejected the notion the NEPA requires an agency

1 to prepare a ‘regionwide’ EIS absent a proposal for regionwide action.” (Dkt. #18-1 at 14).

2 Defendants assert there is no evidence that the Mad River Trail Project is of regional scope, or
3 that there is any federal action that encompasses the entire 200-mile Entiat-Mad River trail
4 system.

5 Finally, defendants rely on 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2), which provides that, in determining
6 the scope of an EIS, agencies must consider, “[c]umulative actions, which when viewed with
7 other proposed actions have cumulatively *significant* impacts and should therefore be discussed
8 in the same impact statement.” (Emphasis added). Defendants argue that this language
9 indicates that full cumulative impacts analysis is only required when the agency itself determines
10 that environmental impacts may be significant. (See Dkt. # 18-1 at 15). Here, because the
11 agency has decided that no significant impacts will result from its actions, there is no
12 requirement that the multiple Forest Service projects be examined together in an EIS. Because
13 an EA is merely a “brief” public document under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9, NEPA does not require
14 that it catalogue the impacts of past, present, and future construction on the ORV trail system.

15 Defendants correctly assert that an EA should merely be a “concise public document.” 40
16 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a). However, they appear to ignore the remainder of the pertinent definition
17 which states that the document must “provide *sufficient evidence and analysis* for determining
18 whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40
19 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (emphasis added). When such sufficiency begins to push the EA toward
20 the same requirements as an EIS, it should put the agency on notice that an EA is not the right
21 tool for the task.

22 Defendants are also correct that “an EA is not intended to be an EIS.” (Dkt. #18-1 at
23 17). They lose sight of the fact, however, that when relying on an EA in a FONSI, the agency
24 must have “based its decision on a consideration of the relevant factors and provided a
25 *convincing* statement of reasons to explain why a project’s impacts are insignificant.” *Nat’l*
26 *Parks & Conservation Ass’n*, 241 F.3d at 730 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)

1 (emphasis added). The EA is not meant to be, and may not serve as, a substitute for an EIS
2 when federal actions may in fact have a cumulatively significant effect on the environment.

3 The Court is not persuaded by defendants' argument that, because the Forest Service has
4 declared its actions to be environmentally insignificant, the agency is then spared the task of
5 fully examining their cumulative impacts. Contrary to defendants' assertions, 40 C.F.R.
6 § 1508.27(b)(7) explicitly marks cumulative impacts as a factor to be considered with respect to
7 significance in an EA. Accordingly, defendants' claim that, "[b]ecause the Forest Service did
8 not identify any 'cumulatively significant impacts,' it was not required to prepare an EIS," is
9 incorrect. (See Dkt. #18-1 at 16). The very essence of NEPA is that the agency take a "hard
10 look" at the potential consequences of its decisions. A simple declaration that a project's
11 cumulative impacts are insignificant, without a convincing explanation of why this is so, fails
12 this test.

13 Although the Mad River EA has numerous sections nominally referring to cumulative
14 impacts, it has one particular failing which renders the Forest Service's decision arbitrary: the
15 cumulative impacts analysis only fully accounts for the incremental environmental effect that the
16 Mad River Trail Project will have to the area above its *current* use levels, and then only with
17 cursory reference to the narrowly defined project area. (See, e.g., AR at 3036) ("There will be
18 no cumulative effect on Natural Integrity, Appearance, and Surroundings"). Aside from its
19 approach to wildlife issues (discussed in detail below), the EA makes no substantial accounting
20 of those use levels (particularly ORV use levels) against the background of what the Chiwawa-
21 Entiat-Mad River trail system might be like *without* motorized use. Simply stated, the EA only
22 fully discloses incremental impacts above current levels, rather than addressing the overall level
23 of environmental impact caused by the trail system.

24 It is the *additive* effect of both agency and other actions taken together that constitutes
25 the gravamen of appropriate cumulative impacts analysis under NEPA. As the Ninth Circuit has
26 instructed:

1 In accord with NEPA, the Forest Service must “consider” cumulative
2 impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c). To “consider” cumulative effects, some
3 quantified or detailed information is required. Without such information,
4 neither the courts nor the public, in reviewing the Forest Service’s decisions,
5 can be assured that the Forest Service provided the hard look that it is
6 required to provide.

7 *Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service (Neighbors I)*, 137 F.3d 1372, 1379-80
8 (9th Cir. 1998).

9 There are both temporal and geographic aspects to this requirement. For this reason,
10 defendants’ assertion that NEPA does not require “region-wide” analysis is misplaced in this
11 case. Likewise, plaintiffs are correct when they point out that defendants’ reliance on *Kleppe v.*
12 *Sierra Club*, 427 U.S. 390, is similarly misplaced. As plaintiffs indicate, the “region” at issue in
13 *Kleppe* was not the functional equivalent of a single ORV track system; rather, it was a multi-
14 state, 90,000 square mile area. (Dkt. # 21 at 17); *Kleppe*, 427 U.S. at 414, n. 25. Even under
15 *Kleppe*, NEPA contemplates that cumulative impacts analysis encompasses a single trail
16 network in a single National Forest.

17 Essentially, plaintiffs’ raise the question of whether, through incremental agency actions
18 and private trail construction, the Forest Service can build an ORV trail system spanning several
19 Forest Districts and approximately 600 square miles of terrain and still convincingly claim that
20 its actions have no significant environmental impact. As plaintiffs pose the question: does
21 NEPA allow the Forest Service to construct a “World Class single track motorcycle trail
22 system”¹ within a proposed Wilderness, *without* preparing an EIS? (Dkt. #14 at 12).

23 The law requires that this question be answered in the negative. The Forest Service failed
24 to heed the warning of *North Cascades Conservation Council* before pressing ahead with the
25 separate Mad River and Goose-Maverick trail projects. Now, as then, “[w]ithin the NEPA
26 scheme, any proposal adding to this ORV system . . . must be examined in light of the entire

¹ This is how the Forest Service *itself* describes the trail system in its public presentations. (See AR at 3627) (presentation at National OHV Collaboration Summit).

1 existing system.” *North Cascades Conservation Council*, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. It also still
2 holds true that “the impact of the existing system, and whether it can bear an increase in use, has
3 never been carefully considered,” and that “[w]ithout examining the ORV trail system, the
4 Forest Service cannot meaningfully measure cumulative environmental impacts in the fashion
5 that NEPA requires.” *Id.* at 1199.

6 Because the Forest Service has again failed to thoroughly analyze the cumulative
7 environmental impacts of the Chiwawa-Entiat-Mad River trail system, its decision to proceed
8 with the Mad River Trail Project was arbitrary, capricious, and not in compliance with NEPA.

9 b. Analysis of ORV Impact on Wildlife

10 In addition to their claim that the Mad River EA failed to properly consider the cumulative
11 environmental impacts of the ORV trail system, plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service’s
12 attempt to study the cumulative effects of trail system on wildlife was inadequate to meet the
13 requirements of NEPA. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the Court in *North Cascades*
14 *Conservation Council* ordered the Forest Service to do a “study” of the cumulative effects of
15 the ORV trail system on wildlife, and that the Gaines Report is not a study within the meaning
16 of Judge Rothstein’s opinion. (Dkt. # 14 at 19).

17 Plaintiffs believe that, instead, the Gaines Report fails to adequately assess the effects of
18 existing motorized trails on wildlife. (Dkt. #14 at 20). What the report does do, in plaintiffs’
19 view, is merely propose “post construction monitoring of impacts and potential responsive
20 modifications in management of use.” (Dkt. #14 at 20) (citing AR at 2835). In other words,
21 plaintiffs believe that all the Gaines Report does is say that “the Forest Service ‘could’ do a
22 study – *in the future* – if it undertakes to do so,” but that it “has not yet done so in the
23 Chiwawa-Entiat-Mad River trail system.” (Dkt. #14 at 20, n.17).

24 Defendants respond that the BAs are sufficient to satisfy Judge Rothstein’s requirement
25 that a site-specific wildlife study be performed. (Dkt. # 18-1 at 20-21). To the extent that
26 defendants respond to plaintiffs’ characterization of the Gaines Report, they concede that it is

1 not a site-specific wildlife study, but argue that it “provides a consistent scientific methodology
2 for the Forest Service to employ in designing site specific studies for the purpose of assessing
3 impacts on wildlife from trail use in a given area under particular proposed project alternatives.”
4 (Dkt. #18-1 at 21). According to the defendants, “[t]he Gaines report was used by the Forest
5 Service as a basis for developing a study methodology, or ‘module,’ in order to conduct a site
6 specific wildlife analysis of the proposed alternatives for the areas affected by the Mad River
7 Trail project.” (Dkt. #18-1).

8 Defendants then appear to implicitly argue that, while the Gaines Report does nothing
9 more than provide a methodology to study the cumulative impacts of the trail system on
10 wildlife, this method was fully applied in the small Mad River Trail Project analysis area. Given
11 the detailed explanation here and in *North Cascades Conservation Council* about how
12 appropriate cumulative impacts analysis must measure the impacts across the *entire* ORV trail
13 system in order to satisfy NEPA, this argument is not entirely persuasive. However, the Court
14 recognizes that the Gaines Report, as applied in the EA, does more than just provide a
15 methodology and a Lower Mad River Trail-specific wildlife analysis, albeit not enough to allow
16 the finding that NEPA has been satisfied.

17 The report, first and foremost, develops a statistical model to qualitatively (as opposed to
18 quantitatively) assess the impacts of the “linear recreation routes” – roads and trails – on
19 wildlife. (*See* AR at 2839-46). It divides species on the basis of their behavioral and habitat
20 characteristics (for example, “wide-ranging carnivores”), and then allows further monitoring of
21 these groups on the basis of “focal species” within them (e.g., gray wolves). (*See* AR at 2840).
22 Then, based on a review of scientific studies, the report hypothesizes likely “buffer zones”
23 alongside trails that subject the various focal species to different levels of environmental stress.
24 (AR at 2841-42). Finally, the report summarizes the results (the actual calculations are absent
25 from the record) of the application of these buffer zones to the trail systems in the Wenatchee
26 National Forest. On the basis of these results, the report estimates, by trail, the level of impact

1 caused by the trail on species groups as low, moderate, or high. (*See, e.g.*, AR at 2880-85).

2 Although the agency's use of the Gaines Report amounts to a tentative step in the
3 direction of cumulative impacts analysis with respect to *wildlife* – for example, enabling the
4 Mad River EA to note that various species in the limited Mad River project area are subject to
5 high, moderate, or low degrees of human influence (*see* AR at 3096-3111) – it does not amount
6 to the sufficient evidence and analysis necessary to conclude that the cumulative effects of the
7 projects are insignificant. If anything, a fair reading appears to compel the opposite conclusion.
8 (*See, e.g.*, AR at 2884) (Table 26, rating the environmental impact of trails on various
9 watersheds as “high”).

10 Moreover, the report's general reference only to the low, moderate, and high impacts of
11 the trail system on certain focal species fails to amount to the actual detailed analysis that is
12 required by NEPA. Indeed, the Gaines Report is frank about its methodology, stating that,
13 “[b]ecause quantitative evaluation of cumulative recreation effects was not possible owing to
14 *data limitations for many species*, we developed a qualitative ranking scheme.” (AR at 2842)
15 (emphasis added). This amounts, in essence, to an admission that no actual, in-the-field study
16 resulting in quantitative analysis (for example, of the type conducted in the BAs) has yet been
17 done for the entire ORV trail system. While those BAs prepared and incorporated by reference
18 in the Mad River EA are certainly sufficient under this standard, they look only at the
19 incremental impacts of the Mad River Trail Project on key sensitive species, and then only in the
20 narrowly defined project area.

21 The report takes the Court – and the public – to a general level of analysis, and then stops,
22 proposing further study. As plaintiffs point out, however, the Forest Service does not
23 incorporate any mandates for actual, system-wide wildlife studies into the Mad River decision.
24 Rather, the agency proposes to construct the Mad River Trail Project, as well as the Goose-
25 Maverick ORV Tie-Trail project and then, at most, apply the “adaptive management strategies,”
26 put forward by the Gaines Report. (*See* AR at 2889-91) (positing a “hypothetical” adaptive

1 management plan, which is – perhaps not coincidentally – surprisingly similar to the project at
2 issue in this case). These strategies amount, when applied to the Mad River Trail Project, to a
3 “build-first, study later” approach to resource management. This backward-looking decision
4 making is not what NEPA contemplates. As the Ninth Circuit instructs, it is not “appropriate to
5 defer consideration of cumulative impacts to a future date. ‘NEPA requires consideration of the
6 potential impact of an action *before* the action takes place.’” *Neighbors I*, 137 F.3d at 1380
7 (citing *City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough*, 915 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in
8 original)).

9 For these reasons, the Court finds that the Forest Service’s consideration of the
10 cumulative impacts of the Mad River Trail Project on wildlife is inadequate, and therefore, the
11 Forest Service’s decision to proceed with the project on the basis that it will cause no significant
12 environmental impact was arbitrary, capricious, and a violation of NEPA.

13 **F. Injunctive Relief**

14 In order to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate, a federal court confronted
15 with a violation of NEPA applies the “traditional balance of harms analysis.” *Nat’l Parks &*
16 *Conservation Ass’n*, 241 F.3d at 737. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “the bases for
17 injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies. In each case, a court
18 must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
19 granting or withholding of the requested relief.” *Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell*,
20 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).

21 While particular attention should be “given to the public interest, ‘[t]he grant of
22 jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under
23 any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated
24 to grant an injunction for every violation of law.’” *Id.* (quoting *Weinberger v.*
25 *Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)).

26 Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer irreparable injury if the Forest Service is allowed to

1 proceed with the project without preparing an EIS. They base this claim on the assertion that
2 the project “will damage the environment by blasting, clearing brush, and constructing a bridge
3 and related ground disturbance.” (Dkt. #14 at 12). With respect to whether the injury plaintiffs
4 claim is irreparable, the Supreme Court instructs, “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can
5 seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long
6 duration, i.e., irreparable.” *Village of Gambell*, 480 U.S. at 545. At the same time, the burden
7 on the Forest Service of preparing an EIS, while significant, is of limited duration. Defendants
8 have failed to address the scope or propriety of injunctive relief in this case. Instead, defendants
9 assert that the ordinary remand rule applies.

10 The Court finds that the ordinary remand rule does not apply to this case. The very fact
11 that this Court has found that an EIS must be completed before the Mad River Trail Project can
12 move forward mandates an injunction. Furthermore, plaintiffs have demonstrated that
13 irreparable injury will occur if an injunction is not issued, and the balance of harms tips in their
14 favor. Accordingly, the Court will enjoin the Forest Service from attempting or completing any
15 work on the Mad River Trail Project, or taking any other action to implement the project, until
16 the agency has complied with NEPA by analyzing the project in an EIS.

17 **III. CONCLUSION**

18 Having considered plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and preliminary injunction,
19 defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, the briefs, declarations and exhibits in
20 opposition and support of those motions, the oral arguments that took place on June 13, 2006,
21 and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby ORDERS:

22 (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #13) is GRANTED.

23 (2) Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #17) is DENIED.

24 (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permanent Injunction (Dkt. #13) is GRANTED, and defendants
25 are hereby enjoined from the construction of the Mad River Trail Project until such time as the
26 Forest Service has completed an EIS.

1 (4) The Clerk shall direct a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

2 DATED this 19 day of June 2006.

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4 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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